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With the popularity of high-bandwidth modems and peer-to-peer networks, the contents of videos must be highly protected
from piracy. Traditionally, the models utilized to protect this kind of content are scrambling and watermarking. While the former
protects the content against eavesdropping (a priori protection), the latter aims at providing a protection against illegal mass
distribution (a posteriori protection). Today, researchers agree that both models must be used conjointly to reach a suﬃcient
level of security. However, scrambling works generally by encryption resulting in an unintelligible content for the end-user. At
the moment, some applications (such as e-commerce) may require a slight degradation of content so that the user has an idea
of the content before buying it. In this paper, we propose a new video protection model, called waterscrambling, whose aim is
to give such a quality degradation-based security model. This model works in the compressed domain and disturbs the motion
vectors, degrading the video quality. It also allows embedding of a classical invisible watermark enabling protection against mass
distribution. In fact, our model can be seen as an intermediary solution to scrambling and watermarking.
Keywords and phrases: content protection, video scrambling, watermarking, motion estimation.
1. INTRODUCTION
With the fast proliferation of high-bandwidth personal
modems (especially ADSL and cable modems), the exchange
of digital multimedia contents has drastically increased. This
exchange is also greatly facilitated by the emergence of digital
communities that share many files across peer-to-peer net-
works. Among these shared files, many are copyrighted, and
in this context, it is necessary to control their distribution in
an open network such as the Internet.
This occurred recently with the MP3 revolution in digital
audio contents. From this time, many MP3 processing soft-
wares including CD rippers, MP3 encoders, and MP3 play-
ers have been posted for free on the Web allowing end-users
to build their own MP3 record collections from their own
CDs. Inevitably, this situation has caused an incredible piracy
activity and Web sites have begun to stream and provide
copyrighted MP3 music for free. In response to this piracy
situation, the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) created the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI,
http://www.sdmi.org) working group to explore technologi-
cally secure alternatives to theMP3 format. This group aimed
at protecting online music from illegal duplication and mass
distribution. To test the proposed solutions, on September
6th 2000, it issued the SDMI challenge to the digital com-
munity inviting people to crack their system. Unfortunately,
students from the Princeton University successfully hacked
the SDMI technology.
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This digital audio situation shows that with the digital
era comes the need for the adaption of business practices.
Traditional methods are often not successful when imple-
mented online. However, technology can evolve drastically
faster than the business world and it has become increas-
ingly diﬃcult for the entertainment industry to adapt at the
same rate as the fast changing world of digital innovations.
The proposal of digital rights management (DRM) technol-
ogy has been initiated in an attempt to overcome these prob-
lems and to initiate new working practices. The DRM sys-
tems generally provide two essential functions: management
of digital rights by identifying, describing, and setting the
rules of content usage, and digital management of rights by
securing the content and enforcing usage rules. However, a
recent report from the Commission of European Commu-
nities [1] shows that today, DRM systems are neither widely
deployed nor widely accepted, mainly due to the reduction
of ease of use, the prevention of generally accepted uses (e.g.,
private copy of content), and a lack of flexibility and inter-
operability between existing systems. Therefore, while piracy
practices are very active, new digital businesses are not able
to take place and peer-to-peer communities can still oc-
cur.
In fact, two diﬀerent problems arise: the content protec-
tion and copy protection. While content protection aims at
protecting the content itself against eavesdropping, the ob-
jective of copy protection is to avoid the illegal mass distri-
bution of copyrighted contents.
Content protection is an old issue in the digital TV envi-
ronment and new cryptographic tools have been proposed
[2], namely conditional access, in this context. Conditional
access systems work by scrambling the content, that is, en-
crypting the content with keys that change frequently. This
kind of protection has been adopted by all digital TV broad-
casting standards, such as digital video broadcasting (DVB)
in European countries.
The problem of copy protection has been tackled in the
analogue TV world by Macrovision with the proposal of the
APS copy protection scheme based on the diﬀerences in the
way VCRs and TVs operate. However, copy protection in the
analogue world is of limited importance due to the degrada-
tion of video quality along with the copy generations. Con-
versely, this issue is crucial in the digital environment in
which digital content can be cloned without loss of quality.
In this way, CD technology has been the first victim with
the advent of CD writers. Consequently, in 1996, the Mo-
tion Picture Association of America (MPAA), the Consumers
Electronics Manufacturers Association (CEMA), and mem-
bers of the computer industry put together an ad hoc group
called Copy Protection Technical Working Group (CPTWG)
to discuss the technical problems of protecting digital video
from piracy, particularly in the domain of digital versatile
disk (DVD) [3]. This working group has addressed four
key problems: content protection, analogue copy protection,
digital copy generation management, and exchange of con-
tents across digital networks. Unfortunately, the content-
scrambling-system (CSS), chosen to encrypt the DVD con-
tent, used a weak 40-bit key and the algorithm was quickly
hacked into by Stevenson [4] in 1999, making it possible to
extract the contents of DVDs in unscrambled form.
All these aforementioned facts show that the content
protection against eavesdropping and illegal copy is a chal-
lenging task and we cannot always be sure that a proposed
method will be totally secure. On the other hand, there is
a diﬃcult tradeoﬀ between system complexity and cost. In
fact, manufacturers often accept a limited amount of piracy
by adopting the well-known mantra “keeping honest people
honest.”
Among methods proposed in literature to protect video
contents, two approaches are classically utilized: scrambling
and watermarking. As scrambling is generally based on old
and proven cryptographic tools [5], it eﬃciently ensures con-
fidentiality, authenticity, and integrity of messages when they
are transmitted over an open network. However, it does not
protect against unauthorized copying after the message has
been successfully transmitted and decrypted [6]. This kind
of protection can be handled by watermarking [7], which is
a more recent topic that has attracted a large amount of re-
search and is perceived as a complementary aid in encryp-
tion. A digital watermark is a piece of information inserted
and hidden in the media content. This information is im-
perceptible to a human observer but can be easily detected
by a computer. Moreover, the main advantage of this tech-
nique concerns the nonseparability of the information to be
hidden and the content. A watermark system consists of an
embedding algorithm and a detector function. The embed-
ding algorithm inserts a message inside media, the detector
function is then used to verify the authenticity of the media
by detecting the mark. The most important properties of a
watermarking scheme include [8] robustness, fidelity, tam-
per resistance, and payload. More details regarding the com-
mon watermarking properties can be found in various pa-
pers, such as [8, 9]. Finally, a wide number of watermarking
technologies have been developed and deployed today for a
wide variety of applications as discussed in [8].
In this paper, we present an alternative video protection
model that we call waterscrambling. This new model is moti-
vated by the following observations:
(i) a scrambling-based protection scheme totally prevents
the end-user from seeing the content. However, it can
be useful, for some applications such as e-commerce,
to show the content under a degraded form in order to
provoke an impulsive buying action;
(ii) a video protection solution based solely on a water-
marking approach does not prevent the propagation
of the content. The watermark must be coupled with
another secure scheme to prevent illegal copy. In fact,
a watermark-based video protection scheme needs a
watermark compliant video player in order to be eﬀec-
tive.
Our waterscrambling solution can be seen as an intermediary
solution between scrambling and watermarking. By disturb-
ing the video sequence motion vectors in compressed form,
our approach degrades the video quality, but still enabling
video content to be perceived by an end-user, giving him an
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idea of the original content. In this sense, our approach is a
scrambling variant. By also being able to embed invisible in-
formation in the motion vectors, our approach satisfies the
previously recalled watermarking requirements.
After presenting an overview of the classical video pro-
tection schemes in Section 2, our waterscrambling process
will be detailed in Section 3. Finally, our conclusions and per-
spectives will be discussed in Section 4.
2. AN OVERVIEWOF VIDEO CONTENT PROTECTION
SCHEMES BASED ONWATERMARKING
TECHNIQUES
2.1. Video content protection problem statement
As underlined in the previous section, two diﬀerent prob-
lems have to be considered when protecting video content:
the protection of the content itself and the prevention of ille-
gal copy.
Content protection is an old issue in the digital TV area
and works by scrambling (i.e., encrypting) video content [2].
To achieve a suﬃcient security level, due to the huge amount
of data giving rise to specific attacks, the heart of the scram-
bling security is a combination of a proven encryption algo-
rithm with a frequent change of keys.
Obviously, the topic of content protection has also been
discussed in the CPTWG with the aim of protecting the con-
tent of DVDs [3]. For this purpose, the CSS algorithm devel-
oped by Matsushita has been adopted.
The CPTWG has also considered the copy protection
problem by embedding a pair of bits in the header of the
MPEG stream. This protection scheme, called copy genera-
tion management system (CGMS), encodes one of the three
possible rules for copying: “copy freely” (i.e., the video may
be freely copied), “copy never” (i.e., the video may never be
copied), and “copy once” (i.e., only a first generation copy is
authorized).
The arrival of new digital networks, thanks to powerful
high-bandwidth digital buses such as IEEE1394, also needs
new security specifications. In these networks, all devices
are connected through digital links and it must be ensured
that video content is not transported in clear text, nor can
be illegally copied during its transfer between devices. This
problem is generally resolved by providing a mechanism
that strongly authenticates all network devices and that al-
lows the content encryption key exchange between authen-
ticated devices. Today, two competing solutions tackle this
kind of problem: the oldest one is digital transmission con-
tent protection (DTCP) that was developed by 5C (a consor-
tium of five companies, including Hitachi, Intel, Matsushita,
Sony, and Toshiba). The second solution, SmartRight, was
designed by Thomson Multimedia and is today supported
by eight other companies (Canal+ Technologies, Nagravi-
sion, Gemplus, SchlumbergerSema, ST, Pioneer, Micronas,
and SCM Microsystems). The protection of video content
over digital networks is of prime importance and for this rea-
son, the CPTWG has created the Digital Transmission Dis-
cussion Group (DTDG) to explore the issue.
2.2. Watermarking protection schemes
A video watermark technique consists of the hiding of in-
formation into a video sequence to protect the video con-
tent as a whole. One way of embedding a watermark into a
video is to independently mark all the video frames by us-
ing techniques from the still image watermarking area. An-
other way is to use the temporal information of the video.
Consequently, we can classify video watermarking schemes
into two main categories: still image-based techniques and
video-adapted techniques. Today, most of the video water-
marking approaches rely on the extension of still image algo-
rithms. However, these algorithms generally lack robustness
since they do not fully consider the video temporal axis. Lit-
erature has provided few watermarking algorithms that con-
sider temporal information as a key advantage to propose a
more robust solution. Eﬀectively, it seems natural to consider
that the robustness of a watermark can be greatly improved
by considering the following two video properties.
(i) Information amount. A video sequence represents a
larger amount of information than a still image.
Therefore, the insertion space of the watermark is in-
creased and can be exploited to insert a more robust
mark.
(ii) Motion information. The object motion increases the
visibility of the mark.
However, the insertion of the watermark is also constrained
by the following.
(i) Runtime complexity. The complexity of the mark inser-
tion scheme should be small, and ideally, the algorithm
should run in real time.
(ii) Compression constraint. The mark embedding process
should not produce a compressed marked bitstream
larger than the unmarked one.
(iii) New class of attacks. Video watermarking leads to
somewhat diﬀerent attacks than those used in im-
age watermarking. Moreover, the mark should be de-
tectable even after a loss of synchronization due to
temporal subsampling or to the selection of a subse-
quence.
2.2.1. Still image-based techniques
Primarily, watermarking algorithms for video were simply an
adaptation of still image techniques. Langelaar et al. [10],
Nikolaidis and Pitas [11], and O’Ruanaidh et al. [12] have
each proposed good overviews of still image watermarking
techniques that can be used to mark video content if we con-
sider the video sequence as a succession of independent still
images. To embed a watermark, we can work in the spa-
tial domain or in a transform domain. In the same way, we
can work with compressed or original uncompressed data.
Finally, to increase the invisibility of the inserted mark, re-
searchers often use a psychovisual mask. Eﬀectively, regard-
ing the properties of the human visual system (HVS) in-
crease the energy of the watermark without generating ad-
ditional visual artifacts. Naturally, these possibilities are also
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valid when marking video, explaining why many still image
watermarking concepts are directly used in video.
One of the main techniques used in watermarking is the
spread spectrum approach firstly introduced by Cox et al.
[13]. In this approach, the use of a pseudorandom bit gen-
erator (PRBG) modulated with an oversampling version of
the mark allows to generate redundancy and randomness in
the embedding process, resulting in a largely increased ro-
bustness. Based on this technique, an approach working in
the spatial domain has been proposed by Hartung and Girod
[14]. In this method, the video is considered as a 1D sig-
nal. However, the authors do not really consider the intrinsic
properties of the video because they store the video signal
into a 1D vector, loosing thus the spatial information of the
still frame as well as the temporal information that charac-
terizes a video. It has to be noted that this scheme is among
the first to deal with video watermarking.
Among watermarking approaches working in the com-
pressed domain, 8 × 8 blocks are generally employed when
embedding the watermark due to their use in compression
standards such as MPEG or JPEG. Koch and Zhao [15] have
developed a still image watermarkingmethod using the JPEG
compression scheme and working in the frequency domain.
They first apply a discrete cosine transform (DCT) on lu-
minance blocks before quantizing them. Then, they pseudo-
randomly select three of these quantized coeﬃcients in the
medium frequencies over which they apply an insertion rule.
This consists of imposing a pattern rule onto the three coef-
ficients depending on the bit to be embedded. Dittman et
al. [16] have proposed two watermarking algorithms: one
adapted from this block-based technique and the other from
the algorithm developed by Fridrich in [17]. In the first ap-
proach, the embedding is performed by marking the 8 × 8
blocks in the DCT frequency domain. In the second one, the
authors embed the mark in the spatial domain. The main ad-
vantage of the second approach is that it is able to embed
more than 250 bits and to withstand stirmark attack. The
first algorithm is more suitable for video and improves the
video quality. However, its complexity does not allow for the
real-time constraint. It has to be noted that both approaches
use the HVS properties to increase the robustness and the
invisibility of the mark.
In [18],Wolfgang et al. proposed a still image watermark-
ing scheme that they have adapted to video content by em-
bedding the mark in the intra frames. In this work, the au-
thors work in the DCT domain and use a spatial masking
approach.
One of the well-known techniques proposed in the video
watermarking topic is the just another watermarking sys-
tem (JAWS) algorithm developed by Kalker et al. that has
been firstly designed for broadcast monitoring [19]. JAWS
is based on simple operations allowing for the real-time re-
quirement in which the video is considered as a succession
of still images. The watermarking payload was initially one
bit, but in [20], the authors achieved an embedding of 36
bits/s thanks to the symmetrical phase only matched filter-
ing (SPOMF) algorithm. This improvement was presented
in [19] where the authors generate a pseudorandom pat-
tern according to the message to be embedded. The water-
mark is then perceptually shaped and scaled before being in-
serted. Although this algorithm is based on still image tech-
niques, it shows a good robustness and is today one of the
major algorithms proposed in video watermarking. It is use-
ful to note that the JAWS-based watermarking solution is
proposed by Philips under the commercial name of Water-
cast.1
Another powerful commercial solution is the one pro-
vided by Nextamp.2 Their algorithm is mainly based on the
still image watermarking scheme developed by Koch and
Zhao [21] and the approach proposed by Baudry et al. [22].
This algorithm meets the real-time constraint.
2.2.2. Video adapted technique
Langelaar et al. [10] and Doe¨rr and Dugelay [23] have pro-
posed comprehensive overviews of video watermarking tech-
niques. While the former deals with basic approaches, the
latter proposes a good view of the actual watermarking prob-
lem. If we consider the problem of digital broadcasting, for
which the runtime complexity must be drastically reduced,
there is a need of getting an algorithm that meets the real-
time constraint and that embeds the mark in the compressed
domain. Hartung and Girod [14] proposed a method that
works in the compressed domain and that involves the em-
bedding of the mark in the video intra frames. Then, they
made a drift compensation for visibility purposes. The mark
is transformed into a 2D signal before being embedded in
the image. The authors consider the compression problem
but they do not use the motion at all. Now, it seems natu-
ral to employ the motion data since it embeds a high-value
added information into the intrinsic video content. For this
purpose, some techniques are based on temporal 3D trans-
forms [24, 25], while others use motion vectors obtained by
a motion estimator [26, 27]. However, it must be empha-
sized that 3D approaches generally consider temporal dimen-
sion in the same way as spatial ones, although they do not
hold the same kind of information. The same drawback has
been noted in the source coding field where this kind of ap-
proach did not reach good results. In [25], Tewfik et al. use a
temporal wavelet transform in order to identify the low and
fast motion areas in the video. They first extract the diﬀer-
ent scenes of the video by applying a temporal segmentation,
and then apply their watermarking algorithm. By doing so,
they can embed two diﬀerent watermarks depending on the
motion activity, and then adapt the watermark to the con-
tent. The temporal axis is performed here for discriminat-
ing the content and not to embed the mark. Moreover, the
temporal wavelet transform greatly increases the complex-
ity of the algorithm. In [24], a 3D discrete Fourier trans-
form (DFT) is used. Due to the separability property of this
transform, it can be considered as the composition of a 2D
spatial DFT and a 1D temporal DFT. The mark is embed-
ded in the magnitude component of the DFT coeﬃcients.
1http://www.watercast.com.
2http://www.nextamp.com.
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Although the temporal aspect is used, the complexity of
this design is a drawback. Most of the temporal transforms
are processed in order to discriminate between the diﬀerent
characteristics of the video content. Most of the time, the dis-
crimination is performed on a motion basis (static/dynamic
area) and/or feature basis (edge/texture area) resulting in
a high computational cost. Some research works deal with
watermarking schemes using motion vectors to embed the
mark. This approach seems to be more appropriate to this
media, but the preferred method is the inclusion of a psycho-
visual mask in order to separate the dynamic zones from the
static ones. Marking motion vectors was first introduced by
Jordan et al. in [26], in which the authors select a set of mo-
tion vectors over which they apply a parity rule to embed the
mark. Later, Zhang et al. [27] used this principle and adapted
the insertion rule by selecting the vector components that
have the greatest magnitude. In [28], Lancini et al. embed
the mark in the spatial domain. They first design a mask
composed of three diﬀerent components, one for luminance
masking, one for texture masking, and the third for tem-
poral masking, then they apply a classical spread-spectrum
technique to embed the mark as in [13]. As mentioned in
[29], JAWS is one of the main algorithms available to protect
and control the illegal copy of DVDs. The main constraint
discussed in this DVD protection topic is the real-time con-
straint, needed for the detection algorithm in order to be in-
corporated in the DVD decoding process. To reach this goal,
the detection is performed directly on the MPEG stream re-
sulting in a drastic reduction of the complexity at the cost of a
slight reduction in performance. Finally, an adaptation of the
techniques present in JAWS was designed in [30], resulting in
a new algorithm that can be used to protect the digital cin-
ema area. In this last design, the temporal axis is the only one
used due to diﬀerent constraints. Indeed, the handled cam-
era used tomake a screener of the projectedmovie introduces
filtering and serious geometrical distortions. Thus, in order
to be resistant to geometric attacks, they adapt their tech-
nique to mark only the temporal axis. More recently, with
the growth of the MPEG4 standard, some watermarking al-
gorithms have been designed to protect the MPEG4 objects.
In [31, 32], the procedure consists first of extracting the ob-
jects from the stream and then embedding a watermark to
protect each of these objects.
In conclusion, transform domain algorithms make the
watermarking algorithms complex and thus costly. For
broadcasting applications, real time is necessary. The best
method in this context is to embed and detect in the com-
pressed domain, or in the spatial (or temporal) domain.
Finally, it can be noted that some authors have proposed
hybrid methods to protect digital contents by combining
cryptography and watermarking. In this way, Macy et al. use
in [33] a multilevel scrambling approach together with wa-
termarking: the video content scrambling is based on the
disturbance of DCT coeﬃcients and the watermarking per-
forms a classical spread spectrum in the spatial domain. In
the same way, Bao [34] proposes to mix public key cryptog-
raphy and watermarking. In [35], Cheng and Li perform a
partial encryption of the content by using a wavelet trans-
form and a quadtree data structure. More recently, Zeng and
Lei [36] have proposed a video protection technique com-
bining a selective bit scrambling scheme in the frequency do-
main, block shuﬄing, and block rotation of the transform
coeﬃcients and motion vectors.
3. THE VIDEOWATERSCRAMBLING APPROACH
3.1. Introduction
Until now, most watermarking systems were designed to
protect a media content by inserting a robust and invisible
copyright mark. Our approach is slightly diﬀerent, since we
use watermarking techniques to insert a visible mark thus
“scrambling” the video content. As underlined in the previ-
ous section, scrambling is commonly employed to prevent
unauthorized access to video data and works by distorting
the data such that the video appears unintelligible to a viewer.
In our mind, this kind of approach is the most eﬀective
one to protect the video against eavesdropping. However, in
some cases, it can be useful to show the video content un-
der a degraded form until the end-user subscribes to the cor-
responding service. In fact, a video protection scheme that
gives the user an idea of the content can lead to impulsive
subscription action, more than a pure scrambling approach.
In this section, we propose such a scheme that we call
video waterscrambling. Contrary to classical scrambling sys-
tems, our process distorts the video quality and is able to
regulate the video visibility from the original to unintelligi-
ble quality. Moreover, it does not disturb the video statistics
as much as other schemes and it is not diﬃcult to keep a
good compression ratio by tuning the waterscrambling level.
Finally, contrary to most existent watermarking and scram-
bling techniques, our waterscrambling system can run in real
time during an MPEG compression phase (because it uses
motion vectors computed during the compression process)
or after the compression by extracting motion vectors from
the MPEG bitstream.
Few research works have proposed adjustable video qual-
ity schemes for security purposes. An access control system
based on fractal coding theory was proposed in [37]. The au-
thors use a fractal coding scheme to adaptively and partially
encrypt an image. In fact, they present an approach based on
iterated function system coding (IFSC) providing both com-
pression and hierarchical access control for images at various
resolution levels. This hierarchical access control scheme al-
lows the terminals to display an image at a low resolution
level. The higher resolution levels (which correspond to a
better image quality) are displayed according to the receiver
access rights that are usually determined by the subscription
agreement.
In our approach, the distortion level is more flexible. Ef-
fectively, contrary to [37] that proposes a coarse granularity
by using only eight encryption levels, we propose a scheme
with fine and continuous granularity. Moreover, our process
is easy to implement and runs in real time. In order to reach
this fine granularity, we build a visible marking system based
on the use of the video motion vectors. As mentioned in
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Section 2.2.2, only two important watermarking techniques
based on motion vectors have been proposed in literature
[26, 27]. However, both methods suﬀer from serious draw-
backs. The approach presented in [26] is based on the parity
of the motion vector components which is not robust. Ef-
fectively, filtering can destroy their watermarks by changing
the parity of some motion vectors. Moreover, both methods
are not reversible, which becomes a problem when the re-
construction of the original video is needed as for our con-
cept. Thus, the goal of the waterscrambling approach pro-
posed in this paper consists in finding a reversible “pseu-
doscrambling” solution which uses and modifies the MPEG
motion vectors. However, if our major idea consists of de-
signing a new kind of a pseudoscrambler, another interest of
this approach concerns the possibility of inserting a water-
mark during the scrambling process in real time (allowing
us to build a complete protection system). To anticipate this,
our waterscrambling solution must be compatible with a wa-
termarking solution. In fact, the insertion rule of our sys-
tem must resist manipulations usually performed on video
data (e.g., compression, filtering, etc.). The marked motion
vectors must be maintained in a local space determined by
the insertion rule to resist attacks aiming at displacing them
around their initial position.
3.2. Embedding scheme
Our waterscrambling procedure is included in an MPEG
compression scheme. The first step consists of extracting the
motion vectors to be marked and two diﬀerent approaches
can be envisaged for this purpose. The first method uses a
syntactic analyzer to extract motion vectors from the MPEG
compressed bitstream, and in this case, the waterscrambling
system is an independent module. The second one consists
of directly modifying motion vectors to be waterscrambled
during the MPEG compression scheme. In this case, we must
use a module compliant with the standard compression one.
To waterscramble the video, a visible mark, defined by
a binary vector W ∈ {−1, 1}N (where N denotes the size of
the mark) is added to a set of chosenmotion vectors. In order
to increase the robustness of the mark, we apply a permuta-
tion σ f (W) on W at each frame f . First of all, as proposed
in [13] and by analogy to spread spectrum communications,
the mark is spread over many frequency bins so that the en-
ergy in each one is very small. Thus, we extract from each
frame f corresponding to an MPEG P or B frame, the set of
the mf motion vectors denoted by Vf = {d if , 1 ≤ i ≤ mf }.
Then, a set V˜ f (V˜ f ⊆ Vf ) of k f ≤ mf selected motion vec-
tors is used to superpose the digital mark signal σ f (W) onto






)T ∈ V˜ f , dWf = d f +Φ(α, σ f (W),Kσf (W)),
(1)
where d f is a motion vector belonging to V˜ f , dWf is the re-
sulting marked motion vector, α denotes the mark strength
(which could be diﬀerent in various data samples), and Φ is
a reversible function depending onW and K , K being a wa-
terscrambling secret key that may be used to enforce security.
To determine the set V˜ f of chosen motion vectors, we
use the waterscrambling key Kσf (W) to initialize a pseudoran-
domnumber generator (PRNG)which outputs k f indexes kif
(i ∈ [1,mf ]) denoting the indexes of the motion vectors of
interest in Vf : V˜ f = {d jf , j ∈ {kif }i∈[1,mf ]}.
We point out that a PRNG is a cryptographic algorithm
used to generate numbers that must appear random [5]. It
has a secret state and it must generate outputs that are indis-
tinguishable from random numbers to an attacker who does
not know and cannot guess the secret state. In this sense, it
is very similar to a stream cipher. Additionally, a PRNGmust
be able to alter its secret state by processing input values that
may be unpredictable. A PRNG often starts in a guessable
state and must process many inputs to reach a secure state.
Yarrow [38] is an example of a secure PRNG that can be used
in our waterscrambling scheme because it has been proven to
be more robust than other PRNGs. The major design prin-
ciple of the Yarrow system is that its components are more
or less independent, so that systems with various design con-
straints can still use the general Yarrow design. The use of
algorithm-independent components in the top level design
is a key concept in Yarrow. The goal is not to increase the
number of security primitives that a cryptography system is
based on, but to leverage existing primitives as much as pos-
sible. Hence, Yarrow relies on one-way hash functions and
block ciphers cryptographic primitives.
To enforce the security level, the waterscrambling key
Kσf (W) is changed for each new video to be waterscrambled.
This key represents the initial state of the PRNG. Our wa-
terscrambling system uses this secret waterscrambling key in
a similar way to a symmetric cipher, that is, the key must
be shared between the content provider and the end-user to
enable the “dewaterscrambling” process. Consequently, a se-
cure channel must be set up between both parties to securely
transfer this key.
Moreover, as the “dewaterscrambling” process needs to
know the strength α that the provider used to waterscramble
the video, the keyKσf (W) must be decomposed into two parts:
the seven first bits of the key contain the strength α and the
other bits denote the key itself used to initialize the PRNG.























f +α×Υ(σ f (W),Kσf (W)), if σif (W)=−1,
d
y
f , otherwise, (2)
where σif (W) denotes the ith component of the vector σ f (W)
andW the visible mark. We can thus see thatW is scattered
in the image by embedding only one bit in each chosen mo-
tion vector of V˜ f .













































Figure 1: Modification of motion vectors distribution after the application of the waterscrambling. (a) Distribution of the x component
(right) and y component (left) of the original motion vectors. (b) Modification of the distribution with a waterscrambling strength α = 20.
(c) Modification of the distribution with a waterscrambling strength α = 100.
Υ is in this case a reversible function allowing for the tun-
ing of the degree of quality degradation.
Finally, to spread the waterscrambling eﬀect, we can in-
sert the visible mark in the transform domain instead of the
spatial one. For this purpose, we perform two 1D DCTs, the
first one on the x components and the second one on the y
components of a global vector V = (Vx,V y)T ∈ R2k f with










By working in the transform domain, we are able to con-
trol the global energy added to the motion vectors by, for
example, only disturbing high or middle frequencies. More-
over, we are able to keep the statistics of the motion vec-
tors distribution, thus avoiding to increase the compres-
sion ratio. To reach this goal, we can define the function Υ
such that it corresponds to a pseudohomothetic deforma-
tion of the coded motion vectors distribution (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 shows an example of such motion vectors distribu-
tion. The distribution of the original motion vectors is illus-
trated on Figure 1a in which the left graph (resp., the right
graph) shows the distribution of the x (resp., y) compo-
nents. The modifications of these distributions with a wa-
terscrambling strength α = 20 and α = 100 are, respec-
tively, shown on Figures 1b and 1c. As it can be noted, pro-
tecting a video with a strength α = 20 does not signifi-
cantly change the distributions, thus allowing it to maintain
approximatively the same compression ratio while degrad-
ing suﬃciently the video quality. Conversely, for a strength
α = 100, the distribution of vector amplitudes in the y di-
rection is greatly aﬀected and the compression ratio is con-
sequently degraded. Although most video codecs code mo-
tion vectors using a diﬀerential approach, these curves show
nevertheless that the coding cost does not change signifi-
cantly. Indeed, the motion vectors are slightly modified by
the waterscrambling scheme and thus remain in a restricted






































Figure 2: Variation of compression ratios according to the water-
scrambling strength on Stefan and Ping-pong sequences.
spatial area. Consequently, by keeping approximatively the
same distribution of motion vectors, we ensure that the cod-
ing cost is close to be the same as the original video con-
tent. In the case where the compression ratio must remain
the same as the original compressed video, we have to choose
the function Υ adequately. In addition, Figure 2 shows the
compression ratio variation according to the waterscram-
bling strength applied to the video. As mentioned before, we
can note that a strength α = 100 increases the compression
ratio of about 35% when averaged over two video sequences.
However, a strength α = 20 generally suﬃces to degrade
the video quality while keeping a suﬃcient level of visibil-
ity (see the second row of Figure 6). In this case, the increase
of compression ratio is only of 10%, which is largely accept-
able.
Once the visible mark is inserted, a classical watermark-
ing approach can follow. A mix of scrambling and water-
marking was first proposed in [39] in which two alterna-
tives are presented. The first one embeds the watermark be-
fore scrambling the content. In this way, the content receiver
descrambles only the content and the mark remains. The
second alternative proposes to send a scrambled video with-
out embedding a watermark. At the receiver side, the content
is descrambled and conjointly watermarked.
In our process, both approaches can be envisaged. Eﬀec-
tively, we can add an invisible watermark W ′ on the same
chosen motion vectors. Converse to the waterscrambling ap-
proach, the strength α may be chosen in order to maintain
the invisibility of the markW ′ onto the original signal. This
watermarking process can be performed in the compressed
or in the uncompressed domain. In our case, we have chosen
to work in the uncompressed domain to avoid the drift eﬀect.
Thus, waterscrambling and watermarking processes are ap-
plied in a similar embedding system, but in a diﬀerent man-
























)T ∈ V˜ f , dW ′f = d f + Φ˜(α, σ˜ f (W ′),Kσ˜f (W ′)),
(3)
in which Φ˜(α, σ˜ f (W ′),Kσ˜f (W ′)) = α × Υ˜(σ˜ f (W ′),Kσ˜f (W ′)),
where Φ˜ and Υ˜ are nonreversible functions (e.g., one-way
hash functions) ensuring that the mark can only be detected
and not extracted, contrary to the waterscrambling scheme.
It is important to note that σ˜ f (W ′) is not necessarily the
same permutation as the one used in the waterscrambling
procedure. However, to improve the robustness of this ap-
proach, the insertion rule must respect a spatial structure
based on the construction of a reference grid G as illustrated
in Figure 3. This rectangular grid is generated in the Carte-
sian space and is associated to a referential (O,i, j). It repre-
sents a block-based partitioning of the image compact sup-
port resulting in a set of block elements E, each of sizeH×K .
We denote Ri as the intersection points between blocks that
we call here reference points.
Each selected motion vector of V˜ f is first projected on G
and this projection serves to compute its associated reference
point. Figure 3 illustrates this process: the extremity of the
projected motion vector
−−→
OC belongs to a block E of G, from
which four intersection points R1, R2, R3, and R4 can be de-
duced. The reference point associated to the motion vector
is the one located at the smallest distance of the extremity of
the vector (according to the L2 distance). In the example of
Figure 3, the reference point of d f is R1.



























Figure 5: Computation of the watermarked vector.
Then, to embed the watermark, the motion vector is
modified (see Figure 4) by constructing in each block ele-
ment E as a rectangular element of size h×k (area Z1), where
h = H−2∗δ1, k = K−2∗δ2, δ1 and δ2 are chosen such that
Z1 and Z2 cover the same area, and Z1 ∪ Z2 = E. Both zones
Z1 and Z2 drive the mark embedding rule: Z1 is associated to
the bit −1 and Z2 to the bit +1.
Then, if we consider that d f = −−→OC is the vector to be
watermarked (see Figure 5) and W ′i is the bit to be inserted,
the watermarked vector dW ′f is computed as follows:
(i) ifW ′i = +1 and d f is in the right place (i.e., in the zone
Z2), then dW
′
f = d f ; otherwise, a central symmetry of




(ii) if W ′i = −1 and d f is in the right place (i.e., in the
zone Z1), then dW
′
f = d f ; otherwise, as the Z2 area is
not compact, three possibilities can appear to compute
dW ′f ;
(a) dW ′f is given by a central symmetry of center B re-
sulting in dW ′f =
−−→
OD (cf. Figure 5a);
(b) dW ′f is given by an axial symmetry parallel to the y-




(c) dW ′f is given by an axial symmetry parallel to the x-




Note that the case illustrated in Figure 5b (i.e., modification
of the motion vector from Z2 to Z1) only needs one kind
of transformation. Indeed, due to the grid structure and the
surface covered by both areas Z1 and Z2, a motion vector lo-
cated within Z2 will be automatically projected in Z1 by ap-
plying a central symmetry.
In fact, after computing dx = Cx − Bx and dy = Cy − By
(with B = (Bx,By)T and C = (Cx,Cy)T), the symmetry is
chosen as follows:
(i) if dx ≤ δ2 and dy ≤ δ1, the central symmetry is applied;
(ii) if dx ≤ δ2, the axial symmetry parallel to the x-axis is
applied;
(iii) if dy ≤ δ1, the axial symmetry parallel to the y-axis is
applied.
In this paper, the first attempt to reach the invisibility con-
straint has conducted us to minimize the distortion applied
to the motion vectors, despite it is well known that this rule
is not necessarily correlated with the visual aspect of the re-
sulting modified video. To overcome this drawback, we have
developed a second approach [40] that consists of choosing
the best motion vector in the neighborhood of the original
one and which is located in the area corresponding to the bit
to be embedded. This last attempt was a significant improve-
ment of the previous one.
Waterscrambling: Disturbing Motion Vectors to Protect Video 2233
For f = 1–N {//N denotes the video frame number
for i = 1–k f {if d if ∈ Z1, then σif (W) = −1;
else if d if ∈ Z2, then σif (W) = +1}}
Algorithm 1: Mark detection algorithm.
3.3. Retrieval Scheme
Our “dewaterscrambling” procedure is included in anMPEG
decompression scheme. The goal of this procedure first con-
sists of extracting the waterscrambled motion vectors, and
secondly in dewaterscrambling them to allow the visualiza-
tion of the original video onto which an invisible watermark
has been embedded as detailed in the previous section. As
for the embedding process, there are two diﬀerent possible
approaches. The first one uses a syntactic analyzer to extract
the marked motion vectors from the MPEG compressed bit-
stream, to correct them and to re-insert the correctedmotion
vectors in the MPEG compressed bitstream. The second one
consists of directly correcting waterscrambled motion vec-
tors during the decompression scheme. In this case, we must
use a module compliant with the standard decompression
one.
To dewaterscramble the video, the dewaterscrambling
module has to extract the waterscrambling key Kσf (W) in or-
der to initialize the PRNG and the strength α that has been
used to waterscramble the video. We recall that the PRNG
outputs the k f indexes kif of the marked motion vectors in
Vf . In this way, we can extract the visible watermark from
each frame f by applying the inverse function of Φ with
∀d f ∈ V˜ f , d f = dWf +Φ−1
(
α, σ f (W), Kσf (W)
)
. (4)
For the classical watermarking system, the original video
content is not used to detect the watermark presence. As for
the waterscrambling system, the key Kσ˜f (W ′) is used to ini-
tialize the PRNG resulting in the knowledge of the marked
motion vectors. The watermark bit inserted in each of the k f
marked vectors dW ′f can then be detected. For this purpose,
we apply the rule illustrated on Algorithm 1.
Once a candidatemark W˜ ′ is detected by Algorithm 1, we
must decide if it corresponds to the real embedded markW ′.
For this purpose, we compute the correlation Cf at frame f
between W˜ ′ andW ′ by the following recursion:
Cf =
Cf−1 × ( f − 1) +
(
1− d(W˜ ′,W ′)/N)
f
, (5)
where d(W˜ ′,W ′) denotes the Hamming distance between
W˜ ′ andW ′ and N is the mark length. If Cf ≥ θ, where θ is a
predefined correlation threshold, W˜ ′ is considered to corre-
spond toW ′.
3.4. Experimental results
Figure 6 illustrates the video degradation obtained with three
diﬀerent mark strengths α on the Stefan sequence. The first
row shows frames of the original sequence (α = 0), the sec-
ond row shows the same frames waterscrambled with α =
40, and the last row shows the waterscrambling results with
α = 60. As expected, the strength α allows the manipulation
of the degree of video degradation: the higher the value of α,
the higher the degree of video degradation.
We have also conducted some experiments on many se-
quences to check the robustness of our proposed watermark-
ing scheme. For this purpose, we first performed some of
the classical sequence manipulations including Divx3 lossy
compression, blurring with a uniform kernel and rotation.
Additionally, we have also tested the robustness of our al-
gorithm on the new codec that appears nowadays, namely
H264. The H264 retained model was IBP with quantization
steps of 10 and 20. Moreover, all optimization parameters
(eighth pixel motion estimation, five reference images, etc.)
have been used. The compression ratio used for experiments
was 1 : 23 for the Divx codec, 1 : 28 for H264 IBP10, and
1 : 123 for H264 IBP20.
The correlation results (cf. (5)) obtained with these at-
tacks on the Stefan sequence are plotted on Figure 7a. We re-
call that the correlation level for a frame index f tells us if
the mark has been detected in f . In this figure, the correla-
tion threshold θ has been set to θ = 0.875. These results show
that the mark is quickly detected, whatever the transform ap-
plied onto the sequence. The best result was obtained with
the Divx compression that needed only 6 images to detect
the mark. The H264 IBP10 compression followed next where
the mark was detected after 7 images. Then, the blur attack
needed 16 images to detect the mark and the H264 IBP20
model 32 images. Finally, the worst result was obtained with
the rotation attack that resulted in a detection at the 82nd
frame. We can also remark that the mark was detected in the
first frame for the original unattacked sequence. By analyzing
these results, we can conclude that our watermark process is
particularly robust to all tested attacks and few sequence im-
ages are needed to detect the embedded mark.
We then checked the attack consisting in slightly displac-
ing the marked motion vectors. Due to the grid structure
used by the embedding rule, when the displaced motion vec-
tor remains in the same area (i.e., Z1 or Z2), the watermark
is right detected. In the other case, the permutation used in
the embedding rule ensures that we are able to retrieve the
watermark. Indeed, each bit of σ˜i(W ′), never being located
in the same place thanks to the statistical accumulation prin-
ciple, enables the watermark to be retrieved. In both cases,
our watermarking scheme proved its robustness against sta-
tistical attacks which try to estimate the mark to remove it.
Finally, another kind of attack may consist in recovering
the original video content from the waterscrambled one. For
this purpose, two kinds of attack can be envisaged:
3http://www.divx.com/.
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Figure 6: Waterscrambling results on the Stefan sequence according to the strength α. The first row represents original sequence (α = 0),
the second row represents results with α = 20, the third row uses α = 40, and the fourth row uses α = 60.
(1) from predicted blocks, each being composed of a wa-
terscrambled motion vector and an error block com-
puted from the original motion vector, one can try to
correct the waterscrambled motion vectors by retriev-
ing an intra block in the corresponding intra frame
that better corresponds to the predicted block. For this
purpose, we project back the predicted block into the
corresponding intra frame before scanning a search
window by looking for an appropriate intra block that
maximizes the PSNR with the current predicted block;
(2) from intra blocks located in P or B frames (which are
not waterscrambled since not being predicted), one
can try to retrieve the original associated motion vec-
tors of neighboring predicted blocks by increasing the
block smoothness between the unwaterscrambled in-
tra blocks and the waterscrambled predicted blocks.
The implementation of these two attacks led to the following
conclusions:
(i) the first attack generates many block artifacts on the
block boundaries. These artifacts can be explained by
the fact the attacker only gets the error block to re-
trieve the original intra block corresponding to the
predicted block. Therefore, he can only find an ap-
proximation of the original block and an approxima-
tion of the original motion vector. This approximation
error causes highly visible artifacts that are drastically
increased with time, being due to the drift eﬀect;
(ii) the second attack has two drawbacks. The first one is
explained by the fact that there are generally few in-
tra blocks in a predicted frame. Thus, we are only able
to approximatively correct the motion vectors of pre-
dicted blocks located in the immediate neighborhood
of intra blocks, but we are unable to ensure the correc-
tion of motion vectors when we walk far from the ini-
tial intra block because the approximation error grows
in the spatial domain each time we consider a new pre-
dicted block to process. The other drawback concerns
the accumulation of the same approximation error in
the temporal axis generating a drift eﬀect.
During our experiments, the first attack gave better results
than the second one and to give an idea about the visual eﬀect
of this attack, we have plotted PSNR curves in Figure 7b. This
figure shows the PSNR of the compressed video sequence,
the unattacked waterscrambled sequence, and the attacked
waterscrambled sequence. As we can see, the attack allows to
slightly increase the PSNR, which remains nevertheless below
the PSNR of the original sequence, proving that this attack is
not eﬀective.
4. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
In this paper, we have presented an alternative video protec-
tion model called waterscrambling. This new model has been
motivated by the proposal of a new solution able to show a
degraded form of content in order to provoke an impulsive







































Figure 7: (a) Correlation results on the Stefan sequence and (b) PSNR gain oﬀered by the proposed attack on the same sequence.
buying action in some applications such as e-commerce. The
developed solution consists of disturbing the video sequence
motion vectors in the compressed domain. Then, a com-
plementary watermarking solution based on a similar ap-
proach has been added to our process in order to prevent
illegal copy. We have created a new rule of embedding pro-
cess by adding the invisible mark to previously waterscram-
bled motion vectors in order to maintain a real-time process.
Therefore, while the motion vectors are visually disturbed
for the waterscrambling scheme, we add only a small pertur-
bation on them for the watermarking approach, making the
unwaterscrambled content similar to the original. Moreover,
while the waterscrambling scheme uses a reversible function
during the mark embedding, the watermarking scheme uses
a nonreversible function. The results reached by these two
processes show their respective potential. Eﬀectively, water-
scrambling appears to be a good intermediate between the
scrambling and watermarking process. Although our water-
marking process first shows good results, it may not be robust
against format changes, like scaling or shrinking. But our first
goal was to resist compression and filter attacks. Now, future
works will be concentrated on the improvement of our wa-
termarking scheme in order to increase its robustness against
other classes of attacks (particularly geometrical attacks). Ad-
ditionally, the rule used to scramble the motion vectors has
to be improved to keep their statistical distribution and con-
sequently to keep the same level of compression. Finally, a
fully compressed domain system has to be developed by tak-
ing care of the constraints brought by this domain on the
watermarking scheme (e.g., drift eﬀect).
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